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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
MILO A. RUPP AND MARY T. RUPP
In Respondent's statement under Point V (A)
(page 13) he suggests that the Appellants acknowledge that a duplicate original of the mortgage was
placed in escrow. Appellants object to this inference
as the evidence shows that there was never a duplicate original filed, and that a copy only of the mortgage, with no signature even typed, was filed.
In Paragraph 5 of Point V (page 15) it is
stated "Mr. Lloyd testified under oath that the note
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and second mortgage was "out of his control." This
is contrary to his statement, also under oath, that
he recorded the second mortgage and that the recorded mortgage is in his possession and has never
been delivered to the escrow agent. (Tr-64)
Respondent under Point III, A, 1, (page 18)
states that Mr. Lloyd gave notice to the Escrow
Agent of the default in writing and that the Notice
was to go to the Bank and not to the Appellants.
May we again call attention to the Escrow Agreement ( Exp-3) page 2, under paragraph (b) where
it specifically states that the grantee is to receive
a copy of such demand and at the bottom of the escrow:
Providing however if demand is made a statement showing amount due signed by grantor
shall accompany said demand.
The evidence is clear that no copy of the demand
and no statement showing amount due signed by
grantor were served upon the Appellants.
Respondent further states that the Escrow
Agent complied by sending notice to pay the due
amount by the 22 day of January (Point III, 2,
(page 19) . Again referring to the Escrow Agreement ( Exp-3)
If, however, at any time prior to full payment
of all principal and interest above specified,
Grantor delivers to you at the office above
specified, written demand for the delivery of
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such documents and property to him, specifying in detail as grounds therefore, either:
(a) That all or any part of any payment of
principal or interest above specified remain
unpaid and that the due date therefore has
passed.
May we emphasize that this notice from the
Bank to the Appellants informing them that plaintiff had made demand was dated December 16,
1963, (Exp-10) and yet the notice served by Plaintiff on the Appellants is dated December 13, 1963
and gives the Defendants until January 22, 1964 to
meet the demand. ( Exp-9) Certainly under these
conditions the due date had not passed and the Bank
was premature in giving notice.
Let us make a further examination of the purported Demand Notice served by the Bank, the Escrow Agent, upon the Appellants: (Exp-10) It
reads:
Ellis Lloyd has made demand upon us to deliver to him the warranty deed now with us
in escrow, together with the abstract and original of the agreement.... Unless payment is
made on or before the 22nd day of January,
1964 ... we will deliver Warranty Deed and
original of said contract.
No notice was ever given to the Appellants of the
demand for handing down of the complete escrow.
As a further argument in reference to said notice by Plaintiff to the Appellants dated December
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13, 1963, such notice was not in conformity with
the Uniform Real Estate Contract which is the basis
of the transaction which specifically provides the
alternative remedies open to the Seller in declaring
a forfeiture of the contract (Exp-7) none of which
have been adopted by the Seller.
The notice from the Plaintiff to the Appellants
dated December 13, 1964 ( Exp-9) is entitled "Notice
of Intention to Declare Forfeiture" and clearly
states:
Unless the payment is made on or before the
22nd day of January, 1964, the Seller will
elect to declare forfeiture and on such action,
all your rights will cease and determine and
you will be required to surrender possession.
No further notice was given to the Appellants
on or after the 22nd day of January, 1964, and
therefore to the time of suit there had been no notice
that the Seller had elected to declare forefeiture and
there had been no legal notice of forefeiture.
Respectfully submitted,
LEGRAND P. BACKMAN
of BACKMAN, BACKMAN
and CLARK,
Attorneys for Appellant
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